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Executive Summary
As there is a widespread perception of legislative gridlock and subsequent failure in
addressing national problems in Korea, this study examines what factors influence the
legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed bill in Korea. This study
uses government-proposed bills from 1988 to 2016 to estimate the effect of explanatory
variables such as divided government, the year of presidential term (one to five year), the
presidential approval rate, the unemployment rate, filibusters, jurisdictional area of a bill, and
the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills.
The results of regression analyses show that there is no evidence divided government
has negatively affected legislative productivity. They also show that bills in the late years of
presidential term have been less likely to be enacted relative to bills in the early years of term.
In addition, bills concerned with economy have been more likely to pass through the National
Assembly with less legislative time than other bills concerned with culture, health and
welfare, and labor. But, the data shows that the ratio of parliamentary members’ bills to
government-proposed bills has reduced legislative success with requiring more legislative
time.
These results suggest that it is not necessary to revise constitutional law in order to
prevent the occurrence of divided government based on legislative passage of bills. In
addition, an increase in parliamentary members’ bills reduces the success of the passage of
bills, but a policy response to that depends on the value of such bills.
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1. Introduction

Why are some bills successfully enacted while other bills fail to be enacted? What
factors primarily affect the time it takes bills to pass through the National Assembly? Many
Korean analysts of the legislative agenda have widely used a concept of legislative gridlock
as a proxy to analyze the cause of legislative success in the lawmaking process. In fact,
legislative gridlock has been defined as a government's inability to enact policy changes that
are essential to public needs and critical national issues (Quirk, 1994, 191), while others have
construed it as the failure of legislators and the president to reach legislative compromises
that alter the status quo (Binder, 2004, 35). Some studies have defined legislative gridlock as
a low ratio of bills that passed to those that were introduced (Mayhew, 1991, 34). These
definitions primarily focused on the legislature’s failure to enact bills during a legislative
session.
Yet, such definition of legislative gridlock is not sufficient enough to represent
legislative failure in the Korean legislative procedure where the rule of continuity during a
parliamentary member’s term is an important legislative practice. Even a bill that fails during
each legislative session in which a bill is introduced still remains alive in the Korean
Parliament until the legislator’s term ends. Thus, to get a better understanding of legislative
gridlock in Korea, it is essential to consider the time a bill has been in process as it passes
through the National Assembly as well as legislative failure simultaneously. Taking this point
into account can lead us to understand the status of legislative stalemate in Korea, and give us
a more precise explanation on the reasons for legislative success in Korea.
In fact, the Korean president can have strong influence on the legislative agenda through
government-proposed bills to the National Assembly submitted in accordance with the
Korean Constitution. Korean presidents frequently use this influence to argue for government
-2-

intervention in a specific area to solve social problems. However, the average legislative time
taken for government-proposed bills in the National Assembly has dramatically increased
since the 16th National Assembly (2000-2004). The graph below shows that more than four
times as much legislative time was needed for a bill to pass through the National Assembly in
the 19th (2012-2014) National Assembly than was needed in the 13th National Assembly
(1988-1992).

Figure-1 Average legislative time of bills from introduction to final decision
(Four-year terms, 1988-1992 to 2012-2016)
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On top of that, it takes 120 days on average for the executive branch to draft a bill at the
beginning of the process before the legislature. The continuously increasing legislative time
might become a main reason for the government’s belated countermeasures for the social
problems.
As a matter of fact, Korea has an ongoing controversy on the revision of the Constitution
and the National Assembly law due to the prolonged legislative time. Many people tend to
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attribute this protracted legislative time to the existence of divided government and filibuster
system. Proponents of constitutional revision highlight the necessity for the change of the
current five-year president’s single term in the constitutional law in order to prevent divided
government. Therefore, in order to get better policy implications, this study focuses on the
factors influencing legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed bill.

2. The institutional characteristics in the lawmaking process of Korea

Korea has a mixed form of government with a president and a cabinet. The president
who is at the top of the executive branch can affect the legislative agenda using governmentproposed bills. This peculiarity of Korean presidency makes Korean government very
disparate from other presidential political systems that do not allow the president, as part of
checks and balances between the executive and legislative body, to submit bills. Korean
presidents have used this legislative authority to carry on the government affairs such as
industrial policies, taxation, and other policy agenda.
The National Assembly has had a unicameral parliamentary system since 1960.
Parliamentary members are made up of local representatives directly elected by the people
and proportional representatives assigned to each party according to its percentage of votes in
the parliamentary election. Parliamentary members have four-year terms, and are eligible to
be reelected without any institutional restriction, which is very different from the president
who has only a five-year single term. This discrepancy between a five-year presidential term
and a four-year legislator’s term has been discussed as one of the reasons for the appearance
of divided government since late 1987, when presidential elections were restored.
Additionally, the main remarkable feature of the legislative session is that every bill that
is introduced in the National Assembly can survive until the end of a legislator’s term without
-4-

being expunged even if it does not pass during the same congressional session of its proposal.
Unlike the congress of the United States that is held every day except for holidays and
recesses for one year, the National Assembly of Korea is held at regular and extraordinary
sessions. The regular session begins on September 1 of each year and lasts for 100 days while
each extraordinary session can be held several times in a year if more than one quarter of the
parliamentary members or the president requests it. Bills are introduced throughout the year
due to the short regular session and the existence of several extraordinary sessions in a year.
As a result, it is meaningless to measure a ratio of bills that passed to those that were
introduced during a year in the evaluation of legislative deadlock. Instead, it is more
meaningful to figure out how long it takes for a bill to pass the congress since its introduction
to the National Assembly.
Meanwhile, one of the most important factors influencing legislative deliberation in the
National Assembly is the introduction of the filibuster system. The filibuster was introduced
in the Korean National Assembly for the first time on May 30, 2012. The purpose of it is to
ensure that the agenda can be discussed through compromise without physical conflicts
among parties, and to give minority more opportunity to participate in the deliberation
process. The filibuster can be allowed in case that there is a request by more than one-third of
the parliamentary members. But, it is to be ended when more than three-fifths of
parliamentary members require its termination. In fact, filibuster has not been frequently used
since its introduction into the Korean National Assembly Act.

3. Literature review

Resent research on legislative productivity can be categorized roughly into two
categories: partisan models and multi-dimensional models. Partisan models mainly highlight
-5-

the effect of divided party control of congress and the presidency on legislative success,
while multi-dimensional models embrace partisan factors, as well as institutional factors such
as bicameralism and supermajority rules, and policy factors.

3.1 Partisan models

Many studies on the president’s legislative agenda primarily deal with the relationship
between divided government and legislative productivity because legislative success is
deeply concerned with affiliation of the president with the legislature. The features of this
affiliation between two constitutional institutions, unified or divided government, provide an
important political context for legislation. These models attempt to determine if divided party
control of government causes the failure of the enactment of significant public policy.
Mayhew (1991) ignited serious debate on legislative productivity under divided
government by insisting that periods of unified government are not associated with high
legislative productivity and that periods of divided government do not necessarily lead to
legislative gridlock, contradicting the conventional wisdom of politics. He argued that the
first half of a president's term and public's supportive mood are more contributive factors for
the passage of legislation. Skowronek (1993), Krehbiel (1996), and Quirk and Nesmith (1994)
agreed with Mayhew (1991). Skowronek (1993) concluded that the president might be
unsuccessful even in the period of unified government when the policy regime is collapsing.
Krehbiel (1996) also contended the possibility of major changes in policy both under unified
and divided government is very low because of the status quo equilibrium. Quirk and
Nesmith (1994) argued that factors, such as the budget deficit, issue complexity, and
uninformed mass opinion, do more to create policy deadlock than divided government does.
But, a number of scholars contradicted Mayhew’s findings. Coleman (1999), Edwards,
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Barrett, and Peake (1997), and Binder (1999) argued that Mayhew’s measure of the
president’s legislative agenda has been inferred by analyzing newspaper articles and depend
on the retrospective judgment of experts. Coleman (1999) disputed that unified government
greatly contributes to the policy achievements when other important variables such as
intraparty factionalism, responsiveness to public opinion, and supermajorities are controlled
in Mayhew’s (1991) original model. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) paid attention to the
potentially significant legislation that failed to pass and claimed that there is more legislation
that failed during divided than unified government, particularly when the president opposes
the legislation. Binder (1999) also argued that divided party control of government appears to
affect the broader ability of the political system to address major public problems.
In Korea, Jang (2001) and Kang (2001) concluded that divided party control of the
government produces extreme conflicts between the president and congress, resulting in
weakened political accountability and efficiency. On the contrary, Park (1992) insisted that
there was no significant correlation between legislative productivity and party control of
government in the 13th Korean national Assembly when divided government in the first twoyears of the parliamentary term and unified government in the second two-year period appear
alternately. He asserted high legislative productivity can be found even in divided
government. Oh (2004) also claimed that there is no meaningful difference in terms of
legislative productivity between divided and unified party control of government according to
his analysis of the legislative productivity from 13th to 17th Korean National Assembly.
This type of research helps us to understand the importance of political context such as
affiliation between the president and congress in the lawmaking process from a political
viewpoint.
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3.2 Multi-dimensional models

Multi-dimensional models take into account other factors as important as political
factors in the analysis of legislative stalemate. Most of all, we can find many institutional
variables are applied as explanatory variables in the analyses.
Extensive analysis of the president’s legislative agenda has been performed by Binder
and Taylor. Binder (1999) tried to resolve the causes and solutions of legislative gridlock for
the president’s legislative performance by classifying three dimensions, electoral/partisan,
institutional, and policy perspective, as independent variables for explaining the stalemate of
enactment. Binder’s electoral/partisan perspective included variables to assess divided
government, percentage of moderates, ideological diversity, and time out of majority, while
the institutional perspective includes bicameral distance, and the filibuster threat. The policy
perspective variables included budgetary situation and policy mood. Binder concluded that
divided government, percentage of moderates, bicameral distance, and the filibuster threat
have positive effects on the gridlock. On the other hand, Taylor (2004) primarily dealt with
the relationship between policy preference of parliamentary members and legislative time to
pass through the congress, controlling for three variables; passing the other chamber first,
days from the end of the regular congress, and the number of bills introduced. He suggests
the gap between the preferences of parliamentary members and the status quo policy,
homogeneity of preferences of legislators, and the distance between president and
parliamentary members in policy preference can decrease the legislative time to passage.
Jeong (2010), Choi (2001), and Mok (2007) investigated the causes and solutions to
legislative conflict and stalemate of the Korean National Assembly. After classifying
independent variables into two dimensions, political and partisan perspectives, Jeong
concluded that party polarization, strong opposition of minority to ruling majority, and
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absence of leadership autonomy are related to the conflict of the 18th Korean National
Assembly. On the other hand, Choi (2001) and Mok (2007) primarily focused on how long it
takes for bills to pass through the Parliament. Choi highlighted the relationship between
environment and legislative actors. He inferred that the speed of proceedings under the
authoritarian regime would be faster than the rate of proceedings under the democratic
system. Mok (2007) also compared legislative time for bills from the 14th to the 17th Korean
National Assembly. He finds that divided government, the second-term of parliamentary
members, and years with presidential election decrease the average length of legislative time
to passage.
This type of model extends the scope of the explanation for legislative gridlock beyond
partisan models because multi dimension models embrace economic and institutional factors
as well as political variables. This study uses this type of model because this study seeks the
comprehensive reasons for legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed
bill.

4. Research Design

The focus of this study is to investigate which factors affect the results of lawmaking
process for a government-proposed bill, and eventually to identify the determinants that, if
any, have a significant impact. Like multi-dimensional models, I research this issue by
examining the effects on the results of a bill of the political, economic, and institutional
factors that were frequently used in the previous studies.

4.1 Data Collection
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The data is derived from the Bill Information (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/main.do),
managed by the National Assembly of Korea. The purpose of the Bill Information is to
supply legislative information to all people transparently and promptly by the Korean
National Assembly. The Bill Information contains detailed information about each submitted
bill, such as proposer, introduction and passage date of bills, legislative steps in the congress,
standing committee that bills are assigned to, types of decision for each bill in the plenary
session, and bill-related reports. Moreover, the Bill Information even has accumulated
retrospectively the records on legislation information since 1954. This study uses the entire
list of 6,341 individual bills of the executive-proposed bills accumulated in the Bill System
from 1988 to 2016 because Korea has same constitutional law without any minor revision for
those periods of time since the end of military rule in 1987.

4.2 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this study is the legislative results of a government-proposed
bill. I use a government-proposed bill because the failure of a government-proposed bill can
explicitly and uniquely illustrate the legislative gridlock between the president and parliament.
In addition, the legislative time taken for a bill to pass through parliament also represents
legislative conflict between the president and parliament effectively. I use the entire 6,341
bills for the analysis of legislative success and 5,281 legislative successes and 1,060 bills for
the analysis of legislative failures. The dependent variables are whether a bill ultimately
passed and how much time elapsed before passage of it. The time is further subdivided into
one year or less, or a great time.
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4.3 Independent variables

This study uses seven independent variables that are considered to have an effect on the
legislative result of a bill in the National Assembly based on previous studies of South Korea
and other countries. These variables are classified into three dimensions depending on each
variable’s perspective: political dimension, economic dimension, and institutional dimension.
Table-4 (see p.16) shows the summary statistics of these variables.

A. Political dimensional variables

Divided government, the year of the presidential term (one to five), and the approval rate
of the president are political dimensional variables.
The first variable is divided versus unified government: I classify the time period of
divided or unified government sessions since 1987. The divided government occurs when
different branches of government are controlled by different political parties. I summarize
those in Table-1 below.

Table-1 The period of divided or unified government
Divided/Unified

Periods

Percentage of seats held by the ruling party

Unified

1988. 2. - 1988. 5

53.70

Divided

1988. 6. - 1990. 1.

41.80

Unified

1990. 2. - 1992. 5.

72.70

Divided

1992. 6. - 1992. 7.

49.80

Unified

1992. 8. - 1996. 5.

53.20

Unified

1996. 6. - 1998. 1.

50.50

Divided

1998. 2. - 1998. 8.

40.50
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Unified

1998. 9. - 2000. 2.

51.20

Divided

2000. 3. - 2001 .2.

42.10

Unified

2001. 3. - 2001. 9.

50.10

Divided

2001. 10. - 2003. 1.

41.40

Divided

2003. 2. - 2003. 9.

37.10

Divided

2003. 10. - 2004. 5.

15.40

Unified

2004. 6. - 2005. 5.

50.80

Divided

2005. 6. - 2008. 5.

49.80

Unified

2008. 6. - 2016. 5.

52.0

Divided

2016. 6. - 2016. 12.

41.70

My hypothesis with regard to this independent variable is that bills under divided
government are less likely to be enacted than other bills under unified government.
The second variable is the year of presidential term. Each year in the presidential term
has different meaning for the president to carry out his or her legislative agenda because each
year becomes a different political time for the president. To be specific, the president’s
legislative influence on the National Assembly tends to be weakened as the remaining period
of the presidential term gets shorter.
My hypothesis related to this independent variable is that bills in the early years of the
presidential term can be enacted more easily than bills in the late years of the term.
The third variable is the approval rate of the president. I use approval rate data drawn
from the Gallup Korea which is one of the most trustworthy survey institutions in Korea. My
hypothesis related to this variable is that bills during a period of higher presidential approval
rate can be enacted more easily than bills in times of low presidential approval rate.

B. Economic dimension variables
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The president and the National Assembly tend to experience some pressure from the
public to make countermeasures by making new policies and legislation for the economic
recovery during economic recessions. This study uses Korean unemployment rate data
released from OECD and IMF from 1988 to 2016. My hypothesis about this variable is that
bills at times with a higher unemployment rate can be enacted more easily than bills during
times of low unemployment rate.

C. Institutional variables

To represent institutional characteristics of the legislative and executive branches, the
variables are introduction of the filibuster, the jurisdictional field of a bill, and the ratio of
members’ bills to government proposed bills as institutional variables.
The first variable is the introduction of filibuster in the National Assembly. As
previously noted, the filibuster was introduced in the Korean National Assembly for the first
time on May 30, 2012. The existence of the filibuster itself can empower parliamentary
minorities and facilitate active discussion in the legislative procedure. In this context, my
hypothesis for this explanatory variable is that the introduction of filibuster makes it more
difficult for a bill to be enacted.
The second variable is the jurisdictional area of a government-proposed bill. Each bill
can be briefly categorized into nine groups; economic division, justice and police division,
diplomatic and defense division, education division, security and administrative division,
health and welfare division, culture division, environment, and labor division1. Because

1

The Korean government organization is made of 17 ministries in accordance with article 26 in

the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION ACT as of 2016: the whole jurisdictional scope of government
can be classified by economic division (the Strategy and Finance Ministry, the Science, ICT, and
- 13 -

economic affairs have been top priorities regardless of the change of the president or ruling
party since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, my hypothesis regarding this variable is that
bills belonging to the economic field can be enacted more easily than other bills.
The third variable is the ratio of parliamentary members’ bills to the governmentproposed bills. Because the increased number of parliamentary members’ bills may distract
legislators’ attention from the government proposed bills, I hypothesize that the ratio of
members’ bills to government proposed bills negatively affects the legislation of government
proposed bills.

4.4 Analytical Methods
I summarize dependent and independent variables for this study as Table-2 (see p.16).
As for the analytical model, there are two dependent variables, success, which is a
dummy variable, and time, which is a continuous variable. The first could be estimated as
probit or logit, with marginal impacts then computed, but the linear probability model also
estimates the same marginal impacts. This is a controversial matter. Wooldridge (2006) notes
the possibility of probability estimates out of range and of the related problem of linear
extrapolation of explanatory variables, but then he concludes: “Even with these problems, the
linear probability model is useful and often applied in economics. It usually works well for
Future Planning Ministry, the Industry, Trade and Energy Ministry, the Land, Infrastructure and
Transportation Ministry, the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affair ministry, the Ocean and Fisheries
Ministry), diplomatic and defense division (Foreign Affairs Ministry, Unification Ministry, and
National Defense Ministry), justice division (Justice Ministry), education division (Education
Ministry), security and administrative division (Interior Ministry), health and welfares division
(Health and Welfare Ministry, Gender Equality and Family Ministry), culture division (Culture,
Sports and Tourism Ministry), environment (Environment Ministry), labor division (Employment and
Labor Ministry)
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values of the independent variables that are near the averages in the sample” (p. 255). Thus,
this study uses the linear probability model instead of probit or logit model to analyze the
effect of the independent variables on the legislative success of a government-proposed bill.
For the second dependent variable, I use OLS (ordinary least squares) regression modes, too.
The analysis model can be defined as below.
Rit = α + β1Gt+ β2Yt + β3At + β4Ut + β5Ft + β6Jt +β7Rt +εt
Where, Rit represents legislative result of a government-proposed bill (passage or failure
of a bill), Gt is whether a government is divided or not when a bill is introduced, Yt is the year
of the presidential term, At is an annual approval rate for the president, Ut is an annual
unemployment rate, Ft is whether it is before and after of the introduction of filibuster, Jt
represents the jurisdictional area of a bill, Rt is the ratio of members’ bills to governmentproposed bills, and εt is an error term.
The second regression uses the same explanatory variables and a dependent variable
defined as the time in days between introduction and passage, given that the bill passes. The
only difference from the equation above is that the dependent variable is Ti for legislative
time.

- 15 -

Table-2 Variables for analysis
Dependent variables

Observations

Legislative result of a 1. Legislative failure; 2. Legislative success after one year;
bill

6,341

3. Legislative success within one year

Independent variables
Observations

▶ Political dimension
Divided

versus 1. Divided; 0. Unified

6,341

Unified government
Year of presidential 1. The first year; 2. The second year; 3. The third year; 4. The

6,341

term

fourth year; 5. The fifth year;

Annual approval rate

The share of positive response from the public

6,341

Annual

The number of unemployed ÷ The number of all individuals

6,341

unemployment rate

in the labor force

for the president
▶ Economic dimension

▶ Policy and Institutional dimension
Introduction

of 1.

After;

0. Before

6,341

filibuster
Jurisdictional area of a 0. Economic division; 1. Justice & Police division; 2. Cultural
bill

6,341

division; 3. Security & Administration division; 4. Education
division; 5. Diplomacy & Defense division; 6. Health & Welfare
division; 7. Labor division; 8. Environmental division

The ratio of members’ The number of members’ bills ÷ The number of governmentbills

to government- proposed bills

proposed bills

5. Findings

5.1 Relationship between independent variables and legislative success
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6,341

The result of the regression summarized as Table-3 below shows that many explanatory
variables have statistically significant effects on legislative success.

Table-3 Legislative success
Variable
Divided government
Year of presidential term
2nd year of presidential term

Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
0.0395

0.01084

t
+3.64

P>|t|
<0.001***

st

Relative to the 1 year of presidential term
-0.0475

0.0130

-3.67

<0.001***

3 year of presidential term

-0.1030

0.0143

-7.22

<0.001***

4th year of presidential term

-0.1969

0.0180

-10.92

<0.001***

-0.2196

0.0221

-11.08

<0.001***

Presidential approval rate

-0.0052

0.0005

-8.13

<0.001***

Unemployment rate

0.0006

0.0042

+0.14

Introduction of filibuster

0.1661

0.0289

+5.75

<0.001***

Jurisdictional area of a bill

Relative to the economic area

rd

th

5 year of presidential term

0.888

Justice & police

-0.0549

0.0148

-3.70

<0.001***

Culture

-0.1781

0.0315

-5.66

<0.001***

Security & Administration

-0.0471

0.0147

-3.20

0.001***

Education

-0.0548

0.0238

-2.30

0.021***

Diplomacy & Defense

-0.0133

-0.0182

-0.73

0.465

Health & Welfare

-0.1526

0.0218

-6.98

<0.001***

Labor

0.0969

0.0295

-3.28

0.001***

Environment

0.0247

0.0187

+1.32

0.187

-0.0188

0.0018

-10.53

1.0028

0.0250

40.12

the ratio of members’ bills to

<0.001***

government proposed bills
Constant

0.000

*** P ≤ 0.01, ** P≤0.05
First, the result shows that legislative success is statistically significantly associated with
divided government, presidential approval rate, introduction of filibuster, and the ratio of
members’ bills to government proposed bills at the 99 percent confidence level. Specifically,
the data supports that legislative success has increased as much as 0.040 (4.0 percentage
points more likely to succeed) in ‘divided government’, and 0.1661 (16.6 percentage points
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more likely to succeed) in ‘filibuster’. Legislative success has decreased as much as 0.0052
(0.5 percentage points less likely to succeed) in ‘presidential approval rate’ and 0.0188 (1.9
percentage points less likely to succeed) in ‘the ratio of members’ bills to government
proposed bills’. However, unemployment rate is not a relevant explanatory variable to affect
legislative success of a bill because there is no statistical evidence.
The result shows that the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has
negatively affected legislative success, which is matched with hypothesis of this independent
variable. However, the fact that divided government and filibuster have positively affected
the legislative success while presidential approval rate has negatively affected it is contrary to
hypotheses for each variable. We may attribute such results to the relatively passive
legislation strategies of the president under divided government, filibuster or lower
presidential approval rate.
Second, compared with the first year in ‘year of presidential term’, the data shows that
bills have been less likely to be enacted in the late years of presidential term. In fact, the odds
of passage have gotten progressively worse with each year, which is consistent with
hypothesis regarding this explanatory variable.
Third, if we pay attention to the result of this regression with respect to the jurisdictional
area of bills, we see that bills in ‘justice & police’, ‘culture’, ‘security & administration’,
‘education’, ‘health & welfare’, and ‘labor’ areas have been less likely to be enacted than bills
in the economic area. The data shows a significantly negative causation between both of
them at the 99 or 95 percent confidence level. This finding also strongly supports hypothesis
for this independent variable. However, ‘diplomacy & defense’ and ‘environment’ is not
statistically significantly different from economic bills.
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5.2 Relationship between independent variables and legislative time

If we look into the results of the regression on the legislative time of bills to pass, it can
be summarized it as Table-4 below. The result shows that legislative success is statistically
significantly associated with divided government, unemployment rate, instruction of filibuster,
and the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills at the 99 percent confidence
level. Specifically, the data supports that legislative time has decreased as much as 24.7 days
in ‘divided government’, 10.5 days in ‘unemployment rate’ and 142.4 days in ‘filibuster’.
Legislative time has increased as much as 17.4 days in ‘the ratio of members’ bills to
government-proposed bills’. However, the data does not show any statistically significant
relation between presidential approval rate and legislative time.
Compared with hypotheses, the result that unemployment rate has reduced legislative
time while the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has increased legislative
time is consistent with hypotheses for each variable. However, the result that divided
government and filibuster have reduced legislative time is contrary to hypotheses for each
variable. Such result could be interpreted as almost in the same context as in the case of
legislative success.
Second, the result shows that bills in the fourth year of presidential term have been likely
to have less legislative time, contrasted to bills in the first year of presidential term. However,
the data does not show a statistically significant relationship between the other years of
presidential term and legislative time.
Third, regarding the jurisdictional area of bills, the data shows that bills in the ‘justice &
police’, ‘culture’, ‘education’, ‘health & welfare’, ‘labor’, and ‘environment’ areas have been
likely to have longer legislative time than bills in the economic area. The data shows a
significantly positive causation between legislative time and those areas at the 99 or 95
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percent confidence level, which strongly support hypothesis for this variable.
However, the data does not show statistically significant difference between ‘security &
administration’, ‘diplomacy& defense’ and legislative time relative to economics.

Table-4 Legislative time of bills passed
Variable
Divided government
Year of presidential term
nd

Coefficient

Robust Std. Err.

-24.7

5.3

t
-4.70

P>|t|
<0.001***

st

Relative to the 1 year of presidential term

2 year of presidential term

9.9

8.2

+1.21

0.226

3rd year of presidential term

-11.9

7.7

-1.54

0.125

4 year of presidential term

-57.9

9.6

-6.01

5th year of presidential term

2.8

11.3

+0.25

0.806

Presidential approval rate

-0.1

0.2

-0.60

0.547

Unemployment rate

-10.5

1.5

-7.08

<0.001***

Instruction of filibuster

-142.4

14.6

-9.77

<0.001***

Jurisdictional area of a bill

Relative to the economic area

th

<0.001***

Justice & police

22.7

8.2

+2.76

0.006***

Culture

64.6

16.9

+3.83

<0.001***

Security & Administration

7.7

7.0

+1.09

Education

87.9

16.1

+5.47

Diplomacy & Defense

-0.1

8.4

-0.02

Health & Welfare

75.5

13.4

+5.65

<0.001***

Labor

37.0

18.5

+2.00

0.046**

Environment

45.4

10.4

+4.38

<0.001***

17.4

1.0

+18.04

<0.001***

124.2

14.7

8.46

the ratio of members’ bills to

0.276
<0.001***
0.986

government proposed bills
Constant

0.000

*** P ≤ 0.01, ** P≤0.05

5.3 Policy implications

To find out better policy implications from the statistical analysis above, I synthesize
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these two analytical results.
First, from the above results of regression, I can conclude that divided government has
not negatively affected legislative results of government proposed bills. Rather, bills under
divided government have been more likely to have legislative success than bills under unified
government. Legislative time of bill passage has also decreased in the divided government.
The data does not show any evidence that divided government has created legislative
gridlock between the president and parliament, or the executive branch has spent more time
on enactment under divided government. Consequently, it seems somewhat irrelevant to
argue that the constitutional revision is necessary for the change of a current five-year
presidential single term to prevent the occurrence of divided government. As previously
noted, proponents for constitutional revision primarily aim to prevent divided government
which occurs due to the discrepancy between a five-year presidential single term and a fouryear legislative term.
Second, according to the analysis above, it seems that the remaining period of
presidential term has had significant impact on the successful legislation of governmentproposed bills. Compared to the bill introduced in the first year of the presidential terms, bills
have been less likely to be enacted as much as 0.0475 (5 percentage points) in ‘second year’,
0.1030 (10 percentage points) in ‘third year’, 0.1969 (20 percentage points) in ‘fourth year’,
and 0.2196 (22 percentage points) in ‘fifth year’ sequentially. This fact accords with our first
assumption that bills in the early years of the presidential term can be enacted more easily
than bills in the late years of the term. Therefore, it is very critical for the president to make
bills into legislations that deal with president’s primary concerns as soon as possible before
the president loses her or his power over the parliament.
Third, if I look into the effect of the jurisdictional area on the legislative results, I find
that bills related to economy have been most successfully enacted with less legislative time
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than bills concerned with other policy areas. Table-5 summarizes bills by jurisdictional area.

Table-5 Legislative result of bills by jurisdictional area
Jurisdictional
area

legislative result
failure

success after one year

success within one year

Total

Economy

384
(13.11%)

245
(8.36%)

2,301
(78.53%)

2,920

Justice &
police

135
(17.93%)

87
(11.55%)

531
(70.52%)

753

Culture

68
(31.34%)

29
(13.36%)

120
(55.30%)

217

Security &
Administration

143
(18.06%)

76
(9.60%)

573
(72.35)

792

Education

52
(18.84%)

47
(17.03%)

177
(64.13%)

276

Diplomacy &
Defense

59
(14.86%)

23
(5.79%)

315
(79.35%)

397

Health &
Welfare

134
(23.65%)

68
(14.95%)

253
(55.60%)

455

Labor

48
(23.65%)

22
(10.84%)

133
(65.52%)

203

Environment

37
(11.64%)

50
(15.72%)

231
(72.64%)

318

Total

1,060
(16.72%)

647
(10. 20%)

4,634
(73.08%)

6,347

According to Table-5 above, bills in the economy and diplomacy & defense areas have
been more likely to be enacted within one year than other bills although the portion of
economic bills among the entire government-proposed bills has been the biggest at over 46%.
This fact implies that economic development has dominated other national issues as the most
important agenda in Korean society. Relative to economic issues, the Korean government and
the whole society have not placed high values on the other national agenda in the fields of
culture, social welfare, and labor.
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Lastly, the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has reduced legislative
success while it has increased legislative time. In fact, the number of members’ bills has
abruptly increased from the 17th National Assembly as we see Figure-2 below. If this trend
keeps going, the president and the executive branch should make the legislation strategy more
efficient to overcome the negative effect on the government-proposed bills.

Figure-2 The number of members’ bills versus government-proposed bills
18000
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16000
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12220
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0
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6. Conclusion and limitations

This study indicates some determinants influencing legislative success and legislative
time of a government-proposed bill in Korea.
Most of all, divided government has not had negatively significant effect on the
legislation of a government-proposed bill in terms of legislative success and legislative time.
On the contrary, divided government has increased legislative success and decreased
legislative time of a government-proposed bill. This result implies that we do not have any
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evidence to support the revision of Constitutional Law in order to prevent divided
government. Also, this study shows that bills have been more likely to pass through the
National Assembly in the early years of presidential term. Another remarkable thing to be
seen in this study is that the Korean government has placed a much higher weight on the
legislation engaged in the economy over other legislations. Lastly, this study shows that the
ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has reduced legislative success with
requiring more legislative time.
This analysis has some limitations. Most of all, this analytical model has some factor
variables which need to be classified into smaller subcategories, but this study curtailed the
level of subcategories to get clear answers. And, some interaction variables could be added
for more in-depth analysis, but this study leaves those analyses to next studies. Also, because
the jurisdictional area of ministry has frequently changed during this study period of time,
there is some uncertainty in analyzing jurisdictional area of bills. Finally, this is an analysis
of the bills proposed by the executive, which are important but a minority of all bills
proposed. Future research could examine members’ bills.
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